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NOTES
Whose Malice Counts?: Kolstad and the Limits of Vicarious
Liability for Title VII Punitive Damages
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' provides several
remedies for individuals subjected to intentional employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2
The statute originally granted only equitable relief, including
injunction, reinstatement, initial hiring, back pay, and other related
remedies In 1991, however, Congress recognized that equitable
relief alone was not achieving Title VII's goals of preventing
workplace discrimination and providing relief for victims of
discrimination Therefore, as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,1
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
2. See ic § 2000e-5(g)(1); id. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994). Employers may not discriminate
in their decisions about hiring and firing, compensation, formation and maintenance of the
work environment, creation of privileges, or classification and training. See id. § 2000e-
2(a)(1)-(2), (d). An employer may, however, discriminate on the basis of a protected
characteristic if the characteristic is a bona fide occupational qualification that satisfies a
legitimate business necessity. See id. § 2000e-2(e). Also, employers owned or supported
by a religious institution may hire only persons affiliated with that particular institution.
See id. Title VII expressly excludes the U.S. government from its definition of
"employer." See id. § 2000e(b). Similarly, persons or entities who employ fewer than
fifteen employees each day for twenty or more working weeks in a year are also excluded
from coverage. See id.
3. See id. § 2000e-5(g)(1). These remedies apply to instances of intentional
discrimination against specific individuals, often termed "disparate treatment." See id.
(stating that such relief is available "[i]f the court finds that the respondent has
intentionally engaged or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice");
Beverly Bryan Swallows, Reducing Legal Risk and Avoiding Employment Discrimination
Claims, FRANCHISE LJ., Summer 1999, at 9,10 (explaining that, in order to recover under
the disparate treatment theory, plaintiffs must prove that the employer intended to
discriminate on the basis of a protected characteristic). Title VII also protects against
employment practices that disadvantage groups of employees based on protected
characteristics. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-
30, 436 (1971) (holding that Title VII was clearly designed "to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees"). Causes of action based on
these practices do not require intent to discriminate and are commonly referred to as
"disparate impact" cases. See Judith J. Johnson, A Standard for Punitive Damages Under
Title VII, 46 FLA. L. REV. 521, 524-25 (1994). This Note deals only with cases of disparate
treatment.
4. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 64 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
602 (acknowledging that the original remedies did not adequately relieve discrimination
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Congress permitted courts to award compensatory and punitive
damages to victims of intentional discrimination under Title VII.6
Congress acknowledged that many victims of employment
discrimination suffered harms that could not be relieved by equitable
remedies alone7 and also agreed that compensatory and punitive
damages were necessary to deter intentional discrimination in the
workplace and to enforce Title VII's prohibitions.8 The new damages
were intended, therefore, to provide greater relief under Title VII
and to boost Title VII's enforcement by preventing violations and
encouraging plaintiffs to take action.9
Like the original equitable remedies, compensatory damages are
available once the plaintiff proves intent to discriminate. 10 However,
Congress has imposed a higher burden of proof on plaintiffs who seek
victims nor provide employers with "incentives to prevent intentional discrimination in the
workplace before it happens"); see also Michael W. Roskiewicz, Note, Title VII Remedies:
Lifting the Statutory Caps from the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Achieve Equal Remedies for
Employment Discrimination, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 391, 394-401 (1993)
(providing a useful summary of the legislators' motivations for permitting compensatory
and punitive damages).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
6. See id. § 1981a(a)(1). Compensatory damages are intended to provide relief for
the types of harm-such as humiliation and pain and suffering-that are not covered by
equitable remedies. See Compensatory and Punitive Damages, Fair Empl. Prac. Man.
(BNA) No. 876, at 431:336 (July 1999) [hereinafter Damages]. Punitive damages do not
remedy actual harm; instead, they punish employers and deter them from committing
further acts of willful discrimination. See id. These awards are capped. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(3). The caps range between $50,000 and $300,000 depending on the size of the
employer. See id, § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 66-69, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 604-07 (providing
anecdotal examples of discrimination victims undercompensated by Title ViI's original
remedial scheme); H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 25 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 718 ("Victims of discrimination often suffer substantial out-of-pocket
expenses as a result of ... discrimination, none of which is compensable with equitable
remedies."); Johnson, supra note 3, at 527 (noting that, before compensatory and punitive
damages were allowed, a plaintiff whose harms were not covered by equitable remedies
would "be afforded no relief even if she prevailed"); see also Statement on Signing the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1701 (Nov. 21, 1991) (stating
that a main goal of the new legislation was to create "meaningful monetary remedies").
8. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 69, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 607 (stating that the
additional damages would deter future discrimination in the general employer
community).
9. See id. at 70, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 608 ("[P]ermitting the recovery of such
damages would enhance the effectiveness of Title VII by making victims of intentional
discrimination whole for their losses, by deterring future acts of discrimination, and by
encouraging private enforcement."). Congress was also motivated to permit
compensatory and punitive damages by its desire to put Title VII on par with 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994). which has permitted such damages for intentional discrimination on the
basis of race. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 64-66,1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 602-04.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1).
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punitive damages." To receive punitive damages, the plaintiff must
show not only intent, but also "malice" or "reckless indifference to
[the plaintiffs] federally protected rights.' 12
Whether plaintiffs seek equitable relief, compensatory damages,
punitive damages, or all three, employers alone typically bear the
burden of each of these Title VII remedies, even though their
individual employees commit the discriminatory acts that cause the
harm 3 For example, employers are liable for awards of punitive
damages, although the required "malice" or "reckless indifference"
usually derives from a supervisor or other person acting on the
employer's behalf. 4 In this way, employers discriminate vicariously,
and when they are liable, they are liable vicariously. 5
Vicarious liability is, however, essential to Title VIi's goals of
compensation and deterrence. Because recovery from the offenders
themselves is at best impractical and at worst impossible, 16 employers
11. See id. § 1981a(b)(1).
12. Id.; see also infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (explaining the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1981a(b)(1)).
13. See LAURA W. STEIN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY at xxiii-xxiv (1999) (stating, in the context of discriminatory harassment, that the
employer pays damages more frequently than the perpetrator); Alan 0. Sykes, The
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment
Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 604 (1988) (stating that Title
VII victims must sue employers in order to recover damages); Rebecca Hanner White,
Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509, 510
(1996) ("[E]ven when discrimination is the product of an individual supervisor's
discriminatory animus ... the employer nonetheless shoulders responsibility for the
discrimination.").
14. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies:
Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title XI, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.
J. 755,759 (1999) ("[T]he entity-defendant is not a living person and it does not act except
through the living persons who work for it."); Jan W. Henkel, Discrimination by
Supervisors: Personal Liability Under Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 49
FLA. L. REv. 767, 768 (1997) ("[A] company only can act through its employees .... );
White, supra note 13, at 518-19 (explaining that, while the bulk of discrimination is done
by individuals, the liability for their actions falls on their employers).
15. See Sykes, supra note 13, at 563 ("'Vicarious liability' may be defined as the
imposition of liability upon one party for a wrong committed by another party. One of its
most common forms is the imposition of liability on an employer for the wrong of an
employee or agent."); see also Rebecca Hanner White, There's Nothing Special About Sex:
The Supreme Court Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725,
727 n.10 (1999) ("As applied in the employment context, [vicarious liability] would hold
an employer liable for the acts of its employees.").
16. Federal courts have almost universally held that employees are not individually
liable for discrimination under Title VII. See Henkel, supra note 14, at 768 & n.3 (citing
relevant circuit court decisions). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has
asserted that it is "inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil liability to run
against individual employees." Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.
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must be held responsible for all damages arising from unlawful
discrimination.17 Recently, however, in Kolstad v. American Dental
Association,18 the United States Supreme Court examined vicarious
liability for Title VII punitive damages and limited the range of
employees whose "malice" or "reckless indifference" can be imputed
to the employer.19 The Kolstad Court also provided a safe harbor
from punitive damages for employers acting in good faith.2 °
Title VII's text does not expressly foreclose vicarious liability for
prohibited types of intentional discrimination.2 1 The statute simply
prohibits "employers" from discriminating and defines "employer"
to include employers' "agents."'  When Title VII was drafted,
Congress contemplated that the statute would apply to the kinds of
employment decisions that legislators believed were the natural
responsibility of employers,24 including hiring, firing, promotion,
demotion, and creation of pay scales.25 Courts have reflected the
legislators' intent by uniformly holding employers liable when their
employees engage in these traditionally recognized types of
discrimination.2 6
1993). Moreover, even if they could be held individually liable, most employees would not
have the funds to pay the judgments against them. See Henkel, supra note 14, at 768
(noting that if victims had recourse only to the wrongdoers themselves, they would gain
little meaningful relief); White, supra note 13, at 543 ("[Mjost individuals do not have the
assets to satisfy such awards.").
17. See Henkel, supra note 14, at 768 (asserting that without vicarious liability,
employers would have less incentive to prevent workplace discrimination); see also Maria
M. Carrillo, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Under Title VII:
Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24 COLUM.
HuM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 89 (1992-93) (asserting that vicarious liability is fair because
employers are in the best position to regulate the actions of the individuals they employ);
White, supra note 13, at 562 (noting that the continued application of vicarious liability is
essential if Title VII is to remain effective).
18. 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
19. See id. at 2128-29; infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
20. 119 S. Ct. at 2129; infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
21. See Carrillo, supra note 17, at 53 (noting the statute's lack of guidance on the
limits of employer liability); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 762 ("[T]he statute
does not address vicarious liability.").
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
23. I1d §2000e(b) (1994).
24. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 762 (asserting that the types of
employment decisions the legislators had in mind would be "attributable to the employer
under any theory of agency"). These forms of discrimination typically result in "tangible
employment actions." See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
25. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 762 (noting the basic types of job
practices upon which Congress based the 1964 Act).
26. For sources making this observation, see infra notes 163-65 and accompanying
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The idea of limiting vicarious liability did not arise until courts, in
the 1970s, began to recognize harassment as a type of intentional
discrimination under Title VII 7  Courts acknowledged that
harassment is actionable not only when it results in an economic or
"tangible" harm, but also when it causes a "hostile environment"
within the victim's workplace. However, because a wrongdoer can
create a "hostile environment" even without the ability to hire, fire,
demote, or promote the victim, 9 many courts have been reluctant to
apply vicarious liability to hostile environment harassment as
consistently as they have applied it to the more traditionally
recognized forms of discrimination. In 1986, the Supreme Court
27. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 758 (noting that, before harassment
was actionable, courts adhered to a strict employer liability standard)). Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom Williams v.
Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), was the first case in which a federal court recognized
the sexual harassment cause of action. See FRANCIS ACHAMPONG, WORKPLACE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 17, 30 n.4 (1999). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) officially recognized sexual harassment as a form of gender discrimination in
1980 and soon thereafter issued regulations defining unlawful sexual harassment. See
MARGARET C. JASPER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW UNDER TITLE VII 25
(1999). In 1983, the Fourth Circuit declared that "[s]exual harassment erects barriers to
participation in the work force of the sort Congress intended to sweep away by the
enactment of Title VII." Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
28. See, e.g., Katz, 709 F.2d at 254-55 (acknowledging that unlawful sexual harassment
includes harassment that causes an offensive work environment); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that a "hostile or offensive
atmosphere created by sexual harassment" violates Title VII). The Supreme Court
validated causes of action for both types of sexual harassment in 1986. See Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1986). Within her examination of women's
managerial employment roles in the United States, Ann Harriman provides a brief yet
useful summary of the progression of the sexual harassment cause of action through the
federal courts and enforcement agencies both before and after Meritor. See ANN
HARRIMAN, WOMEN/MEN/MANAGEMENT 59-64 (2d ed. 1996).
29. Professor White explains that "hostile work environment claims, from the outset
of their recognition, have raised questions about vicarious liability. Because hostile work
environment claims do not involve the granting or withholding of a job benefit or
detriment, co-workers, as well as supervisors, can create a hostile working environment."
White, supra note 13, at 523.
30. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging that courts were unsure of the proper basis for holding employers liable
for hostile environment harassment); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 184
(6th Cir. 1992) (noting that courts had applied different liability standards to hostile
environment cases than to other intentional discrimination cases); see also Fisk &
Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 758 (noting that the sexual harassment cause of action "led
some courts to conclude that employers should not be held automatically liable for
workplace discrimination"); White, supra note 13, at 523-24 (describing courts' reluctance
to impose vicarious liability for harassment that does not cause a tangible employment
action).
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validated this reluctance in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson3l by
holding that common-law agency principles can limit employer
vicarious liability for Title VII sexual harassment claims.32
In the wake of Meritor, some courts weakened Title VII
vicarious liability still further by using agency principles to limit
punitive damages awards in Title VII cases generally.33 Showing
reluctance to "punish" employers for their employees' states of mind,
these courts found that employers were responsible for other
remedies, but not liable for punitive damages? 4 Just before endorsing
this trend in Kolstad, the Supreme Court issued two opinions further
articulating the limits it had suggested in Meritor:35 Burlington
Industries v. Ellerth36 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.3 7 Neither
case dealt explicitly with punitive damages, but their reasoning
proved crucial to the Court's decision to limit vicarious liability for
punitive damages in Kolstad.
This Note explores the effects of the Kolstad holding on
employer liability3 and asserts that Kolstad will prevent appropriate
punitive damage awards in cases in which courts are unwilling to
31. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
32. See id at 72.
33. See, e.g., Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 944 (5th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to hold an employer liable for punitive damages because the offender was only a
manager, not a "corporate officer"); Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803,
810 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that agency law does not support imposing punitive damages
liability on an employer for the acts of a supervisory employee); Reynolds v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 115 F.3d 860, 869 (11th Cir. 1997), (holding that the wrongdoer must be a member of
upper management in order to impute punitive damages to the employer), judgment
vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 947 (1998); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d
1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 1999) (refusing to allow punitive damages because the employees
who wrongfully demoted the plaintiff, while managers, were not "high enough up Wal-
Mart's corporate hierarchy").
see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 762-63 (stating that some courts have
required that the bias derive from high-level company officials).
34. See, e.g., Dudley, 166 F.3d at 1323 ("Although an employer may be liable in
compensatory damages for the discriminating act of its agent, the employer might not be
liable for punitive damages for the same act."); see also Judith J. Johnson, A Uniform
Standard for Exemplary Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 33 U. RICH. L.
REV. 41, 79 (1999) ("Several courts ... have refused to impute punitive damages to the
employer for a supervisor's reckless indifference.").
35. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (noting the circuit court conflicts that
led to the Court's decision to hear Ellerth and Faragher).
36. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
37. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
38. This Note analyzes only that portion of Kostad dealing with an employer's
vicarious liability for punitive damages. The first portion of the Court's opinion discussed
the meaning of" 'malice or... reckless indifference to federally protected rights.'" 119 S.
Ct. at 2124-26 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994)). The text accompanying notes
105-10 briefly explains the Court's interpretation of this statutory language.
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interpret Kolstad with a view toward Title VII's enforcement goals. 9
The Note begins by describing the background law provided by
Meritor, Ellerth, and Faragher.4° It then briefly recounts the facts of
Kolstad and its history in the lower courts4' and details the Supreme
Court's holding on the issue of employer liability.42 To demonstrate
its thesis, the Note first shows that Title VII's text does not support
the Court's requirement that a wrongdoer be an agent in a
"managerial capacity." 43  It then suggests an interpretation of
"managerial capacity" that would more frequently permit appropriate
punitive damages awards.' Next, the Note challenges the policy
behind the Court's creation of a "good-faith efforts" defense to
punitive damage liability45 and urges courts to construe "good-faith
efforts" as narrowly as possible in order to fulfill the enforcement
goals of punitive damages.4 6
In addressing the vicarious liability question in Kolstad, the
Court relied on three of its earlier Title VII decisions: Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson4 7 Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,4  and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.4 9 Although these three cases did not
address Title VII punitive damages, their discussions of agency
principles and Title VII policy provided a foundation for the Court's
reasoning in Kolstad. The Kolstad Court used the principles
introduced in Meritor and applied in Ellerth and Faragher when it
restricted vicarious liability for punitive damages. °
The Supreme Court first examined the idea of limiting vicarious
liability under Title VII in Meritor.51 The case involved a female bank
39. See infra notes 129-235 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 47-85 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 111-28 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 144-97 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 207-23 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
47. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
48. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
49. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
50. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
51. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII
Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 66, 122 (1995) (stating that Meritor provided the Supreme Court with
the first chance to examine the issue of limiting vicarious liability under Title VII); Justin
P. Smith, Note, Letting the Master Answer: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace After Faragher and Burlington Industries, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1786, 1787
(1999) (same). Then-Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion in Meritor, which
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor.
200]
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employee's Title VII action against her employer for damages arising
from sexual harassment by her supervisor 2  After holding that
harassment by a supervisor that results in a "hostile work
environment" is actionable discrimination under Title VII, 3 the
Court questioned whether the employer is always vicariously liable
for a hostile environment created by its employees.' Although the
Court concluded that some limitations on this type of employer
liability are proper,55 it decided not to address these limitations in
detail.5 6 Nevertheless, the Court specifically held that the court of
appeals erred in disregarding agency principles and in finding the
employer absolutely liable for the supervisor's harassing behavior
without regard to the specifics of the situation.57
The Meritor Court noted that Title VII defined an "employer" to
include that employer's "agents."58 It then stated that this definition
reflected Congress's intent that common-law "agency principles"
guide courts in determining employer vicarious liability. 9 More
specifically, the Court stated that such a definition "surely evinces an
intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which
employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. "60 The Court
warned, however, that common-law agency principles, as important
as they are, may not conform to every contour of Title VII.61 Even
though the Court's treatment in Meritor of vicarious liability in hostile
environment situations was limited, its holding eventually formed the
background for future decisions on Title VII vicarious liability.62
For over a decade, federal courts struggled with the proper
application of Meritor's brief treatment of vicarious liability for
See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 58.
52. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. The plaintiff alleged that she at first tolerated her
supervisor's sexual advances because she was afraid of losing her job and that she failed to
report the harassment because she was afraid of her supervisor. See id. at 60-61.
53. See id at 64-67.
54. See id. at 69-73.
55. See id at 72.
56. See id. ("We ... decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on
employer liability."); see also White, supra note 15, at 727 (noting that the Court's
explanation was vague and left many questions unanswered).
57. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
58. See id. at 72.
59. Id
60. Id.
61. See id ("[Common law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars
to Title VII.").
62. See infra note 75 and accompanying text (citing the Court's recognition of
Meitor's importance).
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hostile environment harassment. 3 Serious disagreement developed
during this time among the circuit courts of appeals over the proper
use of agency principles in the Title VII context. 4  In 1998, the
Supreme Court responded to the confusion by issuing two opinions
that state a definitive standard for vicarious liability for sexual
harassment by supervisors.' In both Burlington Industries v. Ellerth
and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Court held that employers
are subject to strict vicarious liability for harassment by their
supervisors that results in tangible employment actions, such as firing
or demotion.' Employers are also vicariously liable for harassment
that creates a hostile environment, but they may assert a complete
defense to liability if they demonstrate that they took prompt
measures to correct harassment and that the plaintiff did not properly
avoid the harm.67
In Ellerth, the plaintiff alleged that she quit her sales job after
fifteen months because she could no longer tolerate being sexually
63. See William R. Corbett, Faragher, Ellerth, and the Federal Law of Vicarious
Liability for Sexual Harassment by Supervisors: Something Lost, Something Gained, and
Something to Guard Against, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 801, 808-09 (1999) (describing
the sharp division over the standard for employer liability).
64. While most courts held that harassment resulting in hiring, firing, or other
"tangible" actions invoked employer liability, see, e.g., Davis v. Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365,
1367-68 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that such actions are imputed automatically to the
employer), they were uncertain as to whether to hold employers liable when the
harassment only created a threat of such action, see, e.g., Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391,
1396-98 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that an employer could be insulated from liability).
Almost every aspect of this confusion was reflected in the eight separate opinions
produced by the Seventh Circuit in Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490
(7th Cir. 1997), which came before the Supreme Court as Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742 (1998). See Corbett, supra note 63, at 809.
65. See Faragher, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (acknowledging that the Court was
adopting the same holding it formulated in Ellerth); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (concluding
that "a uniform and predictable standard must be established as a matter of federal law").
66. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see also infra notes 156-58 and
accompanying text (discussing tangible employment actions).
67. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Justice Kennedy wrote the
opinion for the Ellerth Court and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 746. Justice Ginsburg
wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. See id. at 766 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
the judgment). Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, issued a dissenting opinion in
which he asserted that an employer should only be liable for hostile environment
harassment upon a showing of the employer's own negligence. See id. at 766-74 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in Faragher, which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 779. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented for the
reasons he stated in Ellerth-an employer should not be liable for a supervisor's harassing
behavior unless the employer itself is negligent. See id. at 810 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2000]
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harassed by her supervisor.6 Her supervisor was not a company
policymaker, but he was a manager and was authorized to make
decisions, subject to his own supervisor's approval, about hirings and
promotions.69 In Faragher, the plaintiff, a city lifeguard, likewise
claimed that sexual harassment by her two supervisors had created a
hostile work environment.7  Faragher's first harasser was a
department chief who could hire new lifeguards, supervise all aspects
of their duties, counsel and reprimand them, and make records of
disciplinary actions against them.7' Her second harasser was the
training captain to whom she reported.72 The training captain was
responsible for creating her daily assignments and for supervising her
work and training.73 In addressing the relationships among the
plaintiffs, their harassers, and their employers, the Court in both cases
specifically sought to outline what Meritor had declined to
delineate-the circumstances under which an employer is vicariously
liable for hostile environment sexual harassment committed by its
supervisory employees.74
The Court in Ellerth and Faragher first bound itself to Meritor's
assertion that courts should turn to common-law agency principles
when deciding whether or not vicarious liability applies.75 Because
Meitor had cited the Restatement (Second) of Agency as a source of
common-law agency principles, the Court in Ellerth and Faragher
appealed directly to the Restatement as a useful place to begin the
agency analysis.76 Both opinions acknowledged that the Restatement
permits vicarious liability when the employee's misdeed is in the
"scope of employment," but concluded that sexual harassment is
outside this scope.7 7  The opinions noted, however, that the
Restatement also permits liability for actions outside the scope of
employment if the" '[servant] was aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relation.' "78 The Court then concluded
68. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747.
69. See idL
70. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
71. See ic at 781.
72. See id
73. See id.
74. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785-86; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 746-47.
75. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754. Faragher further states that
"Mertor's statement of the law is the foundation on which we build today." Faragher, 524
U.S. at 792.
76. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755-56.
77. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756.
78. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(2)(d) (1958)); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758 (same). The Restatement provides three
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that when an employee has succeeded in taking a tangible
employment action against the harassment victim, such as firing,
demotion, or a pay decrease, the "aided in the agency" relation is
definitively established.79 In other words, if an employee holds the
authority to undertake tangible employment actions that affect other
employees, he is an agent of the employer."0
The Court held in both cases that employers are also vicariously
liable for sexual harassment that creates a hostile work environment,
even though no tangible harm results.8' Noting, however, that it was
compelled to satisfy Meritor's holding that agency principles limit
vicarious liability, the Court created a safe harbor provision for
employers in hostile environment cases.' The Court held that, when
a supervisor's discrimination against an employee results in a tangible
employment action, the employer is vicariously liable to the employee
and may not defeat liability with an affirmative defense.s On the
other hand, when a supervisor's discriminatory behavior creates only
a hostile work environment, the employer is still vicariously liable,
but may assert a two-part affirmative defense.84 The employer must
establish the following: (1) that the employer promptly used
reasonable care to prevent and correct the wrongdoer's conduct; and
(2) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed either to use any
preventive or corrective opportunities the employer had provided or
to otherwise curb the harm caused by the discriminatory conduct."
Ellerth and Faragher, therefore, establish that Title VII requires
absolute vicarious liability when the plaintiff's employment is tangibly
harmed. Following Meitor's instruction on agency principles,
however, the Court limited vicarious liability for hostile environment
harassment to situations in which the employer cannot prove its fault-
other instances in which an employer ("master") may be liable for his or her employee's
("servant's") actions outside the scope of employment. Liability may be proper when "(a)
the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or (b) the master was negligent or
reckless, or (c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(a)-(c).
79. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791 (noting the soundness of court decisions equating
agency with the ability to take tangible employment actions); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761
(same).
80. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762-63 ("Whatever the exact contours of the aided in the
agency relation standard, its requirements will always be met when a supervisor takes a
tangible employment action against a subordinate.").
81. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763-64.
82. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763-64.
83. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
84. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
85. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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based defense. As the following discussion of Kolstad v. American
Dental Association86 demonstrates, the Court is also willing to use
agency principles to limit vicarious liability in contexts other than
hostile environment harassment.
In Kolstad, the majority used these agency principles to place
boundaries around vicarious liability for punitive damages.s7 Carole
Kolstad was the Director of Federal Agency Relations for the
American Dental Association ("Association") in its Washington,
D.C., office." In 1992, one of the Association's high-level legislative
program directors announced his plan to retire, and Kolstad applied
to fill the vacancy.89 Tom Spangler, the Association's Legislative
Counsel, was also vying for the prestigious position.90 Leonard
Wheat, head of the Washington office, had previously given both
Kolstad and Spangler "distinguished" performance ratings.91
Although Wheat had requested that Dr. William Allen, director of
the Association's Chicago office, make the final hiring decision,
Wheat recommended that Spangler be hired for the job.92 Allen took
Wheat's recommendation and selected Spangler.93
Alleging that the selection of Spangler was based on gender
discrimination as prohibited by Title VII, Kolstad brought suit against
the Association in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.94 She supported her contention by introducing evidence
that Spangler, who had less experience with the Association and less
experience with the type of work related to the vacant position, was
pre-selected for the job in an effort to prevent a woman from filling
it.95 Kolstad showed that Wheat had been unwilling to meet with her
about the job, that Allen altered the job description to match more
closely Spangler's qualifications, and that Wheat had been heard
86. 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
87. iL at 2128-29.
88. See id. at 2122.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. As required, Kolstad first exhausted her remedies through the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. See id.; see also U.S. Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission, Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination: Questions and
Answers (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html> (providing a
concise overview of an employee's charge processing procedures through the EEOC).
95. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 960-61 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 408 (1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2118
(1999).
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making sexually offensive and derogatory remarks about prominent
professional women. 6 The jury found that the Association had
indeed violated Title VII by discriminating against Kolstad based on
her gender and awarded her $52,718 of equitable relief in the form of
back pay.97 The district court, however, determined that Kolstad did
not make the showing necessary to permit a jury instruction on
punitive damages."
Kolstad appealed the district court's decision not to instruct the
jury on punitive damages, 99 but the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed that a punitive damages
instruction would have been improper.1'0 The court first made clear
that the statute does not permit punitive damages if the plaintiff has
shown nothing more than intent to discriminate.'' The court then
concluded that the standard for punitive damages requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer engaged in "egregious
discriminatory conduct."'" Because the court of appeals determined
that Kolstad had not met this threshold requirement, 0 3 it affirmed the
district court's decision without explaining the requirement in
detail.' 4
Noting the conflict among the circuits over the proper
interpretation of the punitive damages statute,0 5 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.0 6 The Court rejected the District of Columbia
96. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2122-23; Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 960-61.
97. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2123; Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 961.
98. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2123; Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 961.
99. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2123.
100. See id.; Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 969-70.
101. See Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 963.
102. I at 969.
103. See iU at 965.
104. See id- at 970.
105. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2123 ("We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among
the Federal Courts of Appeals concerning the circumstances under which a jury may
consider a request for punitive damages under § 1981a(b)(1).") (citation omitted). The
Fourth Circuit had previously indicated that punitive damages are reserved only for
"egregious" cases of discrimination, see Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 982 (4th
Cir. 1997), as had the Ninth Circuit, see Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299,
1304 (9th Cir. 1998). Other circuits expressly rejected this approach as inconsistent with
the plain language of the punitive damages statute. See Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d
210, 220 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Ortiz v. John 0. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1127 (1st Cir.
1996) (emphasizing the wrongdoer's state of mind); McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant,
83 F.3d 498, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that cultural and educational differences do not
mitigate the defendants' offensive acts). The First Circuit had also recently held that a
"jury need not find some special sort of malign purpose in order to exact punitive damages
in a disparate treatment case." Dichner v. Liberty Travel, 141 F.3d 24,33 (1st Cir. 1998).
106. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2123.
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Circuit's conclusion that malice or reckless indifference requires
egregious conduct. 107 Instead, the Court held that the terms "malice"
and "reckless" refer solely to the wrongdoer's state of mind, not to
the severity of discrimination.108 According to the majority, to
demonstrate that discrimination was committed " 'with reckless
indifference to [an employee's] federally protected rights,' " a
plaintiff simply must show that the discrimination was committed
with knowledge that it was or may have been unlawfu.1. 9 The Court
held that, while egregious or reprehensible acts of discrimination can
provide compelling evidence of the necessary state of mind, they are
not a prerequisite to sending the issue to a jury."0
The Court's opinion, however, did not end with its interpretation
of the punitive damages statute. The majority stated that, beyond a
showing of the requisite malice or reckless indifference, "[t]he
plaintiff must impute liability for punitive damages to [the
employer]."'' This vicarious liability question, however, was not
squarely presented to the Court in Kolstad.12 The majority addressed
the issue sua sponte, asserting that employer liability was "intimately
107. See iL at 2123-24.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 2124 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994)). The Court identified a few
situations in which a finding of the requisite knowledge would not be proper even where
there was intent to discriminate. See id. at 2125. Among these were situations in which
"the employer may simply be unaware of the relevant federal prohibition." Id. Whether
the Court intended to sanction a "mistake of law" defense is uncertain, but the language
does seem to permit an escape from punitive damage liability even where the employer
should have known the discrimination was prohibited. One commentator anticipated this
confusion and concluded that Congress surely did not intend to create such a loophole.
She asserted that "[ijgnorance of the law has never been a defense in a Title VII case;
however, Congress may have intended to allow some ignorance of the nuances of the law
to be a defense in this regard." Johnson, supra note 34, at 65; see also Kwong Wah, 83
F.3d at 509 (holding that "[i]gnorance of the law or of local custom is not a defense under
Section 1981a," but a "defendant's cultural background is not irrelevant in evaluating the
appropriateness of punitive damages"). While this Note does not explore this problem,
the exact meaning of the apparent "mistake of law" exception is likely to be an issue in
future Title VII litigation.
The Kolstad Court noted that a finding of knowledge required for "reckless
indifference" may also be improper when an employer has a distinct belief that the
discrimination is permissible or has a reasonable belief that it falls into a statutory
exception. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2125. A "reckless indifference" finding may also be
improper where the "underlying theory of discrimination may be novel or otherwise
poorly recognized." ld.
110. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2126.
111. Id.
112. Id at 2132-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
the parties had not briefed the issue and arguing that the facts of Kolstad's case did not
raise it); see also Damages, supra note 6, at 431:338 (stating that the Court decided an issue
that was not before it).
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bound up with ... and ... subsumed within the question on which
[the Court] granted certiorari.""' The Court then proceeded to
explore when an employer can be held liable for its employee's
"malice" or "reckless indifference."'1 4
Consistent with its approach in Ellerth and Faragher, the Court
in Kolstad applied common-law agency principles to examine when it
is proper to limit Title VII vicarious liability."5 As it had done in
these earlier cases, the Court recognized the Restatement (Second) of
Agency as the best place to begin articulating the common law."6
The Court noted that, although the Restatement strictly limits
vicarious liability for punitive damages, the Restatement permits
liability when" 'the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and
was acting in the scope of employment.' ",n The Court applied this
provision to Title VII and determined that a "managerial capacity"
finding is necessary to impute liability for punitive damages to an
employer. Instead of outlining what such a capacity entails,
however, the Court advocated case-by-case analyses of each
wrongdoer's role in the employer's operations.1 9 The majority
advised that each analysis of an employee's managerial capacity
should look to the type of authority and amount of discretion the
113. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2127. Five Justices joined to form the majority in the
vicarious liability portion of the Court's opinion. See id at 2121. The four dissenters to
this portion of Kolstad, rather than rejecting the majority's rationale or approach, simply
argued that the Court should not have addressed the issue at all. See id. at 2132-33
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Writing for the dissent, Justice
Stevens noted that "[ilt is not this Court's practice to consider arguments... that were not
presented in the brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari." Id. at 2133 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at 2121. This Note does not dispute that vicarious liability
and the punitive damages provision are closely related, nor does it speculate about
whether it was appropriate for the Court to address an issue not squarely before it. This
Note does attempt, however, to articulate some problems created by the Court's reasoning
and, in so doing, perhaps incidentally supports the dissent's call for restraint.
114. See iL at 2127.
115. See id. at 2127-28.
116. See id. at 2128.
117. It. (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C(c) (1957)). The
Restatement also considers punitive damage liability proper when "(a) the principal
authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or (b) the agent was unfit and the
principal was reckless in employing him, or ... (d) the principal or a managerial agent of
the principal ratified or approved the act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 217C. The Court did not discuss these other three provisions as applicable to Title VII
punitive damages liability. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2128.
118. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2128.
119. See id ("[D]etermining whether an employee meets [the managerial] description
requires a fact-intensive inquiry.").
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employer has given to the offending employee.12 0
Despite adopting the "managerial capacity" portion of the
Restatement's exception, the Court rejected the "scope of
employment" portion.12 ' The Court first explained that, in general,
"scope of employment" may include acts that the employer has
expressly forbidden; under common-law agency principles, then,
discrimination on the basis of sex could be considered within this
scope.'2 The Court was concerned, however, that if the "scope of
employment" principle were to be transferred directly to Title VII,
even employers who try diligently to comply with the statute's
mandates would be liable for punitive damages due to discrimination
by their managerial agents.123 The majority found this type of
absolute liability unacceptable for two reasons. First, the Justices
argued that it conflicts with the common-law agency principle that
states that it is "'improper ordinarily to award punitive damages
against one who himself is personally innocent and therefore liable
only vicariously.' "124 Second, they asserted that absolute liability
conflicts with Title VII's goal of encouraging employers to implement
measures to prevent and remedy discrimination.23 Earlier in its
opinion, the Court stated that, because punitive damages require an
employer to have acted "with 'malice or with reckless indifference to
... federally protected rights,' " the employer should not be liable for
such damages if it did not know that its behavior was unlawful. 26 The
Court was concerned that, without a safe harbor from punitive
damages liability, employers might be tempted to avoid punitive
damages by not educating themselves and their employees about
Title VII's prohibitions.1 7 To avoid these consequences and to
square the common law with Title VII's purpose of encouraging
employers to implement antidiscrimination measures, the Court held
that "an employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory
employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are
contrary to the employer's 'good faith efforts to comply with Title
VII.' ",128
120. See id.
121. See id. at 2129.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 cmt. b (1965)).
125. See id.
126. Id at 2124 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994)).
127. See id. at 2129.
128. Id. (quoting Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc) (Tatel, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 408 (1998),
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In sum, the vicarious liability portion of Kolstad held that even if
the plaintiff establishes that her superior intentionally discriminated
with "malice" or "reckless indifference" and that he was a
"managerial agent" of the employer, she might not be awarded
punitive damages. The employer can avoid liability if the evidence
permits a finding that it made "good-faith efforts" to prevent
unlawful discrimination among its managers and employees.
A main goal of the punitive damages provision is to help enforce
Title VII by deterring unlawful conduct.'29 The limitations on liability
established by Kolstad will undermine this purpose by creating the
potential for employers to avoid punitive damages liability more
often than Title VII's text and policy allow. The following analysis
demonstrates this potential by showing that the "managerial
capacity" limitation is unsupported by Title VII's text 30 and that the
"good-faith efforts" defense is not sufficiently justified by the Title
VII policy of employer self-education.' Lower courts can
nevertheless reduce the impact of these limitations by interpreting
and applying the new Kolstad framework to effectuate, as often as
possible, the deterrent purpose of punitive damages. This analysis
suggests a broad interpretation of "managerial capacity"'3 and urges
a specific, narrow, and case-by-case examination of "good-faith
efforts.' 33
Relying on Meritor's statement that common-law principles limit
Title VII vicarious liability, the Kolstad Court explicitly accepted the
proposition that one who discriminates with "malice" or "reckless
indifference" must be an agent in a managerial capacity before the
employer can be liable for punitive damages." A close look at Title
VII's language, however, demonstrates that the "managerial
capacity" limitation was not called for by the text of the punitive
damages statute. Title VII's punitive damages provision creates its
own express limitations on liability for punitive damages, and these
limitations do not require reference to the Restatement language
cited by the Court.135 First, Title VII requires that the "respondent"
vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999)).
129. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (citing the legislative history behind
the 1991 Act).
130. See infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 207-23 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 144-97 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
134. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2128.
135. Cf Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 783 (noting, similarly, that the Court
overlooked important provisions of Title VII when, in Ellerth and Faragher, it chose to
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intentionally discriminate "with malice or with reckless indifference
to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual. 136
Punitive damage liability, therefore, is limited to situations in which
the wrongdoer knew or suspected she was violating the law. 37
Second, Title VII explicitly states that the term "respondent" includes
"employers,"' 38 and that "employers" includes employers' "agents." '
Therefore, any "agent" of an employer who discriminates with the
requisite state of mind should subject the employer to liability.140 The
Court's insistence that the wrongdoer be not just an "agent," as
expressed in the statute, but be an "'agent ... employed in a
managerial capacity,'" is unsolicited.' 41 Title VII has defined the
employer in express terms and has crafted a separate analysis for an
employer's punitive damage liability.142 It has not left open a. gap to
be filled by the "managerial capacity" language of the Restatement.
There may indeed be some call for courts to use common-law agency
principles to determine who qualifies as an "agent," but Kolstad has
improperly rewritten the statutory language to require a special, more
advanced degree of agency than the punitive damages statute
requires.1 43
Nevertheless, the Court has imprinted the "managerial capacity"
requirement on all future Title VII punitive damages analyses. 44 In
explaining what- must be shown in order to demonstrate that the
wrongdoer was not just an agent, but an agent "employed in a
managerial capacity," the Court held that each case requires a "fact-
intensive inquiry."" The majority stated that such an inquiry reviews
the type of authority and amount of discretion the employer has given
the wrongdoer. 46 The Court also suggested that an employee must
be "'important,'" but that the employee does not need to be at the
top of the employer's hierarchy to be acting in a managerial
rely on Meritor's vague use of agency principles).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994).
137. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2125; see also supra note 109 and accompanying text
(explaining the Court's holding and some of the qualifications of that holding).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(n) (1994).
139. Id § 2000e(b).
140. See id. § 1981a(b)(1); iad § 2000e(b).
141. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2128-30 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 217 C(c) (1957)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); id. § 1981a(b)(1).
143. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2128.
144. See id at 2130.
145. Id. at 2128.
146. See id. at 2128.
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capacity.147 Ultimately, though, the Court stated that "managerial
capacity" has not yet been well-defined, 14 and the Court itself
declined to define it. 49
If courts choose to define managerial capacity narrowly, they
may exonerate employers even if the perpetrator truly wielded a
great deal of the employer's authority.150 If courts are to achieve the
enforcement purposes of punitive damages, however, they must
interpret "managerial capacity" broadly. This Note does not attempt
to offer a comprehensive interpretation of managerial capacity, but it
at least argues that, as a matter of law, wrongdoers with the authority
to take tangible employment actions-such as firings, demotions, and
pay decreases-against their victims are employed in a "managerial
capacity. ' 15 ' To support this contention, this analysis discusses the
original intent of Title VII and the reflection of this intent in the body
of federal Title VII case law,'152 the intent of the 1991 Act,1 53 a closely
similar analysis in Ellerth and Faragher,54 and the Solicitor General's
oral argument before the Kolstad Court. 55
An employment action is "tangible" when it significantly alters
the employment status of the victimized employee. 6 The Supreme
147. Id. (quoting 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIvE
DAMAGES § 4.4(B)(2)(a) (3d ed. 1995)).
148. See id. (citing 2 JAMEs D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIvE DAMAGES:
LAW AND PRACTICE § 24.05 (1998)).
149. See id
150. In Kolstad's situation, for instance, the court on remand may find that, Wheat was
not acting in a managerial capacity, even though he was the acting head of the entire
office. See id. at 2122. Recently, the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina reached a similar conclusion in Scott v. Ameritex Yarn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.S.C.
1999). Despite the fact that the wrongdoer was the supervisor of the entire plant in which
the victim worked, see id. at 590, the court refused to find that the supervisor was
employed in a managerial capacity, see id. at 597. The court therefore concluded that
there was no basis, according to the Kolstad rationale, for imputing the supervisor's
misconduct to the employer. See id. at 597-98.
151. This analysis does not in any way suggest that a finding of managerial capacity
requires the employee's ability to take a tangible employment action, only that the ability
to take a tangible employment action requires a finding of a managerial capacity. Indeed,
punitive damages may also be vital to employees with non-tangible harms-their harms
may be inflicted with an equal degree of "malice" or "reckless indifference." This
analysis, however, is limited to arguing that tangible employment actions demonstrate
managerial capacity as a matter of law.
152. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
156. See Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); Enforcement
Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Compl.
Man. (BNA) N:4075, N:4078 (visited February 29, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/
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Court has offered examples of tangible employment decisions,
including "hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or ... a significant change in
benefits."'57 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) maintains that tangible employment actions can also include
any unwanted changes in job duties, even if pay and benefits are not
reduced."8
Title VII was originally intended primarily to curb tangible
employment actions-these were the basic types of harms the
legislators contemplated when they enacted the statute.159 Title VII's
failure to address vicarious liability demonstrates that the legislature
did not question the propriety of holding employers liable when these
types of discrimination occurred. 6  As Professors Fisk and
Chemerinsky note, Title VII does not address vicarious liability
because Congress had only considered the kinds of discrimination
that "would, without doubt, form the basis of employer liability."16'
In other words, if an employee is wrongfully fired from his job
because he is Asian, male, or because he practices Judaism, there is
no reason to examine whether the employer is liable; an employee
with the authority to do the firing acts for the employer-effectively,
she is the employer. 62
Federal case law is consistent with this analysis. The courts have
harassment.html> [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance].
157. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761; see also Enforcement Guidance, supra note 156, at N:4078
(listing hiring, firing, promotion, failure to promote, demotion, undesirable reassignment,
significant benefit changes, changes in compensation, and work reassignment as tangible
harms).
158. See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 156, at N:4078. The EEOC also expressly
disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's contention in Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172, 175
(4th Cir. 1998), that a dramatic increase in workload does not constitute a tangible
employment action. See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 156, at N:4078 n.32.
159. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (noting the particular types of
employment decisions that the legislators had in mind). Congress originally intended for
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which Title VII was a part, to protect primarily race-based
tangible employment actions. See HARRIMAN, supra note 28, at 50-52. Gender was
something of an afterthought, which made its way into the statute only narrowly and after
opposition by many legislators who either found it unnecessary or wanted it to be placed
in a separate act. See id.; Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986).
160. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 762 ("Because such practices were the
paradigmatic form of discrimination prior to 1964, Congress simply did not anticipate
employer liability would be a big problem, and in many Title VII cases it has not been
one."); supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text; see also White, supra note 13, at 520
("Because Title VII ... define[s] employer to include 'any agent' of the employer, the
statutes are understood to have incorporated the principle of respondeat superior.").
161. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 762.
162. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
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uniformly construed Title VII to impose automatic vicarious liability
when a tangible employment action occurs.163 As the Meritor Court
noted in 1986, "the courts have consistently held employers liable for
the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory personnel,
whether or not the employer knew, should have known, or approved
of the supervisor's actions."'" In 1998, the Ellerth Court noted
approvingly that every federal court of appeals that has addressed the
issue has held that employers are vicariously liable for discriminating
acts that cause tangible harms. 65
Punitive damages were not expressly permitted under Title VII
until 1991,'" five years after the Court issued Meritor. To justify
limiting punitive damages to the acts of agents in a "managerial
capacity," the Court in Kolstad determined that Congress left intact
Meritor's suggested limits on vicarious liability when it promulgated
the 1991 Act.67 The Court asserted that these limits must therefore
be observed when interpreting the Act's language.'
The Court's conclusion, however, is illogical. The "limits"
provided by Meritor were stated in a very specific context-
163. See, e.g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating
that employers are strictly liable to plaintiffs who suffer economic harm as a result of a
supervisor's discrimination); Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59,
62 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that liability for harassment causing economic injury is
automatically imputable to the employer); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc.,
464 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding an employer liable under Title VII where a
member of its lower management fired an employee on racial grounds); see also Carrillo,
supra note 17, at 88 (noting that "employers are held vicariously liable for all
discriminatory acts by a supervisor except in harassment cases"); Fisk & Chemerinsky,
supra note 14, at 758 (stating that courts applied a strict vicarious liability standard before
the recognition of harassment as a cause of action); White, supra note 15, at 727 (noting
that strict vicarious liability had been "applied routinely"); Susan Webber Wright,
Uncertainties in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 11, 17 (1999) ("In
discrimination cases, courts have uniformly found an employer liable when the
supervisor's discriminatory actions result in a 'tangible employment action.' ").
164. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,70-71 (1986).
165. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
166. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2124 ("[T]he statute provided no authority for an award
of punitive or compensatory damages."); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 252
(1994) ("Before the enactment of the 1991 Act, Title VII afforded only 'equitable'
remedies. The primary form of monetary relief was back pay."); see also Johnson, supra
note 3, at 527-28 (noting that the 1991 Act's compensatory and punitive damages
provisions augmented the original remedial provisions of Title VII); White, supra note 13,
at 540 (noting that "the remedial scheme originally devised for Title VII was interpreted
to allow recovery of only equitable remedies for a statutory violation"); supra notes 4-9
and accompanying text (explaining Congress's motivations for creating the new damages
provisions).
167. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2128.
168. See i&. at 2127 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 n.4
(1998)).
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harassment causing a hostile work environment.169 During the time of
Congress's debates over the 1991 Act, courts almost unanimously
held that employers were subject to strict vicarious liability for
supervisory discrimination in every context except hostile work
environment harassment.70 It is unlikely, then, that Congress had the
Meritor limits firmly in mind when structuring the 1991 punitive
damages provision.' 7' Moreover, Meritor's guidance was brief, vague,
and not definitively applied by the Court until Ellerth and Faragher,
seven years after the punitive damages provision was enacted.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts had
articulated the "limits on employer liability" clearly enough by 1991
to assume that Congress incorporated them into the 1991 Act. 73
Instead, the statute should be interpreted according to its true
construction. The punitive damages provision explicitly states that
punitive damages are available if the "respondent" engages in the
requisite type of intentional discrimination.7 4 Title VII defines
"respondent" to include "employer,"'"7 and "employer" includes an
employer's "agents."'76 These "agents" were intended to be those
persons given the authority to commit the acts of discrimination
contemplated by the 1964 Act. 77  The new punitive damages
provisions did not change Title VII's intent to provide strict vicarious
liability at least for the types of intentional discrimination it originally
contemplated-those that are today known as "tangible.' 178
169. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59-62,73.
170. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (giving examples and citing sources
observing this agreement); see also Johnson, supra note 34, at 81, 86 ("At the time of the
1991 Civil Rights Act, there was no question but that employers were generally strictly
liable for the acts of their supervisors.").
171. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 79 (arguing that if the employer is liable for other
types of damages caused by a particular employee's discriminatory acts, Title VII's text
provides no basis for not imputing the supervisor's reckless indifference to the employer);
White, supra note 13, at 542 (explaining that "nothing in the legislative history of the 1991
Civil Rights Act suggests Congress intended an exception for vicarious liability when it
comes to punitive damages").
172. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text (explaining the limits of the Court's
holding in Meritor and the confusion among courts over its proper application).
173. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 783 ("[Courts imposed most of the
limits on vicarious and individual liability after 1991. Thus, one honestly cannot infer
much from Congress' failure to address vicarious liability.").
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994) (addressing the determination of punitive
damages).
175. 1d § 2000e(n) (1994).
176. Id. § 2000e(b).
177. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text (explaining the types of
discrimination that the legislators originally contemplated).
178. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text; see also supra note 171 and
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This basic notion also did not change when the Supreme Court,
in Ellerth and Faragher, announced definitive standards regarding
liability for harms not considered tangible. Indeed, the Court in
Ellerth interpreted agency principles to require employer liability for
tangible harms.179 The Court announced that tangible employment
actions are, for Title VI's purposes, the acts of the employer.'
Furthermore, the Court drew the line between absolute and
defensible vicarious liability at the tangible employment action: the
ability of an employee to take such an action is the definitive sign that
she acts as employer.' 8 ' This rationale should apply in creating the
baseline interpretation of "managerial capacity" suggested by this
Note. By analogy to Ellerth and Faragher, those who take tangible
employment actions have demonstrated that they act for the
company; if they intentionally discriminate with "malice" or "reckless
indifference," the company itself has also done so as a matter of law.
The Ellerth and Faragher decisions did not specify any limits on
the types of damages for which an employer would be subject to strict
vicarious liability."is Therefore, lower courts could reasonably assume
before Kolstad was decided that these cases incorporated punitive
damages.8 3 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' pre-Kolstad decision
in Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.184 demonstrates this
assumption. The court in Deffenbaugh sought to determine whether
the trial court had properly refused to instruct a jury on punitive
damages when the plaintiff had been wrongfully fired on the basis of
accompanying text (providing sources arguing that the 1991 Act did not intend to further
limit vicarious liability).
179. See Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) (stating that when an
employee takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate as a result of unlawful
discrimination, "it would be implausible to interpret agency principles to allow an
employer to escape liability").
180. See id The Court further stated that, "[tiangible employment actions are the
means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on
subordinates. A tangible employment action requires an official act of the enterprise, a
company act." Id.
181. See id
182. See White, supra note 15, at 750 (recognizing that the remedies issue "went
undiscussed in Faragher and Ellerth").
183. See, e.g., id (assuming that, because the Court imputed intent to harass to the
employer, it also imputed punitive damage liability to the employer); Jessica Marlies,
Note, Risky Business: Employers' Liability for Hostile Environment Under Title VII, 45-
50 (Oct. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(recognizing that the two cases appeared to impose absolute liability for punitive damages
the same as they did for other remedies). With this assumption, Marlies argued that the
Court should have bifurcated the damages analysis. See Marlies, supra, at 45-50.
184. 156 F.3d 581,581 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 188 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 1999).
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her race. 5  The court interpreted the tangible employment action
distinction in Ellerth and Faragher to apply to all aspects of a Title
VII intentional discrimination claim.'86 The court recognized that
Ellerth and Faragher did not exclude punitive damages from their
strict vicarious liability holdings.'Y7 The court then held that, because
the plaintiff's supervisor took a tangible employment action against
her based on race, the jury could find the employer responsible for
punitive damages if the supervisor's discrimination was committed
with the requisite malice or reckless indifference to the plaintiff's
right to be free from discrimination.'8 Based on its interpretation of
Ellerth and Faragher, the Deffenbaugh court required no further
inquiry into the duties and responsibilities of the plaintiff's supervisor;
the supervisor demonstrated ample agency through his ability to fire
the plaintiff.8 9
The federal government also interpreted the Ellerth/Faragher
holdings to incorporate punitive damages. The government's view
was reflected in its oral argument before the Court as amicus curiae in
Kolstad.19 While the government's representative, Solicitor General
Waxman, did not brief or raise the vicarious liability issue, the
Justices nonetheless pressed him to discuss it, and in response he
argued effectively that tangible employment actions necessitate
vicarious liability for punitive damages.91 The Solicitor General first
accepted for the sake of argument that employers are vicariously
liable for punitive damages only when the wrongdoers whom they
employ work in a managerial capacity,192 but then concluded that
managerial capacity is demonstrated when a wrongdoer exercises her
185. See id. at 584-85 (involving workplace repercussions of an inter-racial
relationship).
186. See id. at 593.
187. See id-
188. See id at 593-94.
189. See id. at 593. Of course, Kolstad's "managerial capacity" requirement compelled
the Fifth Circuit to review this decision. The court recognized that the "tangible
employment action" factor may not be as decisive in determining imputability as Ellerth
and Faragher seemed to hold. See Deffenbaugh, 188 F.3d at 278. The court nevertheless
concluded, on the basis of the wrongdoer's position and authority, that a jury could
reasonably find that he was acting in a "managerial capacity" and that Wal-Mart could be
liable for punitive damages based on his actions. See id.
190. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *18-19, Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n,
119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999) (No. 98-208), available in 1999 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 14 (Mar. 1,
1999) (oral argument of Solicitor General Waxman for United States, as Amicus Curiae,
supporting petitioner).
191. See id
192. See id.
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ability to take a tangible employment action against the victim. 93 He
asserted, for example, that if a supervisor hires or fires someone in a
malicious, intentionally discriminatory way, the jury should
automatically be able to consider awarding the victim punitive
damages.19 4 In effect, the government asserted that any tangible
employment action committed with the requisite "malice" or
"reckless indifference" should permit the jury to consider awarding
punitive damages.
Without either expressly espousing or rejecting the government's
view as presented by the Solicitor General, the dissenters in Kolstad
used the government's contention as a strong argument that the
Court should not have addressed the vicarious liability issue in the
first place.195 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, cautiously observed that the government considers the
Restatement's "managerial capacity" principles to be incorporated
into Title VII's punitive damages provision whenever tangible
employment actions occur.196  Justice Stevens then criticized the
majority for disregarding the government's interpretation of its own
statute, especially because the government had not been given the
opportunity to brief the issue. 97
If the Court had read a complete briefing and heard a thorough
oral argument of the vicarious liability issue in Kolstad, it might have
recognized what the Solicitor General and this Note contend: an
employee who possesses and exercises an ability to take a tangible
employment action against another employee demonstrates that she
acts as the employer. "Managerial capacity," then, should at least
incorporate situations in which the wrongdoer displayed this ability,
and punitive damages should be, as a matter of law, imputable to the
employer when this ability is exercised. Without this degree of
certainty, courts may improperly remove punitive damages from
juries' consideration, and the enforcement purpose of punitive
damages may be undermined.
A broad interpretation of "managerial capacity" is all the more
important because Kolstad also permits employers to escape punitive
damages through their good-faith efforts. 198 This good-faith efforts
193. See idl
194. See id.
195. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2133 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
196. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197. See iUt (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
198. See i. at 2128-29; supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
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defense may further undermine the deterrent purposes of punitive
damages by not holding employers fully responsible for malicious,
unlawful discrimination committed by those in whom they place their
authority. This part of the Note first briefly questions the Court's use
of Title VI's preventive purpose as authority for creating the
defense.119 It then encourages a narrow construction of the term
"good-faith efforts" so that punitive damages may remain available as
a way of encouraging employers to prevent the "malice" or "reckless
indifference" of their employees from unlawfully limiting
employment rights.20 0
Although this Note refers to the good-faith escape from liability
as a defense, the Kolstad Court did not state explicitly how the issue
of the employer's good-faith efforts should be presented in court.20'
In remanding Kolstad to the court of appeals for further findings, the
Court simply stated that the factfinder may need to decide if
Kolstad's employer had been making good-faith efforts to prevent
unlawful discrimination.2 2 The Court made no suggestion that the
plaintiff bears the burden of first demonstrating that the employer
was not making good-faith efforts.2013 On the other hand, the Court
did not refer to the good-faith requirement as an affirmative
"defense" and thereby make it clear that the employer must prove
good-faith efforts by a preponderance of the evidence.204 Because the
employer is the best source of information for its own workplace
standards, this analysis assumes that the Court's "good-faith efforts"
provision is intended to be an affirmative defense for the employer.05
199. See infra notes 207-23 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 224-32 and accompanying text; see generally Edward L. Rubin,
Punitive Damages: Reconceptualizing the Runcible Remedies of Common Law, 1998 Wis.
L. REv. 131 (1998) (emphasizing the roles that punitive damages can play in obtaining
compliance with certain guidelines and arguing that these damages generally should be
viewed not as punishment, but as analogs to administrative penalties).
201. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2129-30.
202. Id. at 2130.
203. See iL at 2129-30.
204. See id. When the Court limited vicarious liability in Ellerth and Faragher for
hostile environment discrimination, it explicitly described the employer's safe harbor as an
affirmative defense subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c). See Faragher, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 765 (1998). This careful description makes the Court's lack of clarity in Kolstad
difficult to explain.
205. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit appears to agree, describing the
provision as "the good-faith defense." See Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1999). But see The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Leading
Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 359, 368 (1999) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (stating that
Kolstad "presumably places the burden of proving that an employer did not make a good-
faith effort on the plaintiff").
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Regardless of whether the burden of proof is on the employer or the
victim, however, liability becomes fault-based rather than vicarious.
The defense consists essentially of proving the employer itself, within
its policies and practices, did not contribute to the discrimination.2°
Despite this procedural ambiguity, the most troubling aspect of
the safe harbor provision is that the Court did not find explicit
authority for it in either the text of Title VII or in common-law
agency principles.' The punitive damages statute itself does not
provide or suggest an affirmative defense based on the employer's
actions,2°8 and the common-law principle the Court found most
relevant-the "scope of employment" provision-actually supports
the imposition of strict vicarious liability.m 9
Ultimately the Court turned to Title VII's preventive purpose to
justify creating the defense.21° The Court emphasized that, while Title
VII also exists to provide remedies to victims, its main goal is to
prevent unlawful discrimination.21' The Court noted that vicarious
liability for punitive damages would undermine Title VIl's purpose of
encouraging employers to take preventive measures against
discrimination 12 Earlier in the opinion, the Court held that punitive
damages are not appropriate unless the wrongdoer, knowing that
such discrimination was unlawful, intentionally discriminated against
the victim.21 3 The Court asserted that employers might perceive this
206. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2129-30.
207. See id at 2128-29.
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(b) (1994). The Court in Kolstad did not actually
mention the use of "agent" in the definition of "employer," but it expressly incorporated
Ellerth's discussion of this language and concluded from it that "[i]n express terms,
Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles."
Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2127 (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998)).
In criticizing Ellerth, Professors Fisk and Chemerinsky argue that Congress's use of
"agent" was not a cue for courts to rigidly apply common-law agency principles to Title
VII cases. They assert that "one might be forgiven for thinking that this was something
less than an express, unambiguous direction to use 'traditional agency principles' to
discern the proper scope of employer liability." Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at
781.
209. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2128; supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text
(explaining the Court's argument that, if the common-law "scope of employment" concept
were imposed directly onto Title VII, an employer's liability for punitive damages would
indeed be strict); see also White, supra note 13, at 538 (stating that "common law agency
principles support vicarious employer liability for discrimination").
210. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2129.
211. See id (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,806 (1998); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,417 (1975)).
212. See id
213. See id. at 2123-24; supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (explaining the
Court's interpretation of the state of mind necessary to impose punitive damages).
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
requirement as a penalty for educating themselves and their
employees about unlawful discrimination,214 so it created a safe
harbor provision based on the employer's "'good-faith efforts to
comply with Title VII.' ,215 The provision, therefore, was created to
counterbalance a perceived negative effect of punitive damages
liability on Title VIr's preventive policy.216
The policy of encouraging employers to implement anti-
discrimination measures, however, is not strong enough to provide
the sole justification for the safe harbor. Absent the safe harbor
provision, employers still have strong incentives to implement anti-
discrimination measures. First, punitive damages are not an issue
until there is an actionable grievance, and anti-discrimination policies
and practices can eliminate much of the intentional employment
discrimination that leads to such grievances.2 17 Indeed, vicarious
liability for punitive damages should only increase an employer's
incentive to prevent incidents of discrimination.lB Second, when an
anti-discrimination effort does not prevent unlawful discrimination, it
may nevertheless prevent it from being taken to court. For instance,
if the policies and programs are instituted in good faith, employees
may be more receptive to conciliation and less likely to sue for
damages.219 Third, if an incident of intentional discrimination reaches
the litigation stage, an employer's anti-discrimination measures may
still prevent it from being responsible for large monetary awards. For
example, if the discrimination was in the form of hostile environment
harassment, the employer's preventive policies may establish half of
the affirmative defense to liability provided by Ellerth and
214. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2129.
215. d (quoting Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc) (Tatel, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 408 (1998),
vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999)).
216. See id
217. See, e.g., ACHAMPONG, supra note 27, at 160-61 (explaining that many types of
preventive measures can reduce occurrences of harassment); James C. Sharf, Proceedings
of the 1999 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Section on Employment
Discrimination Law: Is There a Disconnect Between EEOC Law and the Workplace?, 3
EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 131, 139 (1999) (asserting that using objective
employment procedures lowers employers' risk of discrimination suits and therefore
"makes good business sense").
218. See Carrillo, supra note 17, at 84 (stating that vicarious liability best promotes the
1991 Act's goals by "creating the strongest incentive to establish preventive measures by
employers"); Leading Cases, supra note 205, at 366 (arguing that, in itself, potential
liability for punitive damages prompts employers to reduce workplace discrimination).
219. See, e.g., Swallows, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that the early resolution of
complaints reduces the chances that victimized employees will bring suit).
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Faragher.22 Finally, in any type of discrimination suit, the employer's
policies and practices may prevent a court or jury from concluding
that actionable discrimination occurred in the first place; the issue of
damages may, therefore, never arise.221 In sum, employers have
ample reason to institute preventive policies beyond avoiding liability
for punitive damages. Employers are not likely to risk bad publicity
and liability for other types of damages simply to avoid punitive
damage liability, especially when punitive damages are statutorily
capped' and are available only when the discrimination was
perpetrated with malice or with reckless indifference2m
Although it provided only dubious justification, the Court
nevertheless firmly established the safe harbor provision. The Court
did not, however, offer much guidance on what may be considered a
"'good-faith effort to comply with Title VII.' "I In formulating the
protection, the Court stated only that Title VII generally encourages
employers to create anti-harassment policies, grievance procedures,
and education programs. The Court did not indicate how
employers might make these measures adequate. 26 If courts permit
"good-faith efforts" to include measures that do not work effectively
220. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (stating the requirements of the
defense); see also ACHAMPONG, supra note 27, at 164 (explaining the possibility of
avoiding liability for hostile environment harassment through policies permitting "prompt
and adequate remedial action calculated to ending the harassment").
221. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form from Substance: Understanding
Employer Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 1,
13 (1999) (stating that the very existence of anti-discrimination mechanisms may influence
courts to conclude that discrimination did not occur).
222. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994); supra note 6 (giving the range of these caps).
223. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (quoting the statutory language behind
this requirement).
224. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2129 (quoting Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d
958, 974 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Tatel, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401, cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 408 (1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999)); see Julie Brienza, Supreme
Court Makes Punitive Damages for Job Bias Harder to Get, TRIAL, Sept. 1999, at 16, 16
(discussing the reaction to the defense by the American Trial Lawyers Association, whose
representative stated that " '[t]his part of the opinion really raises more questions than it
answers' "); Linda Greenhouse, Punitive Damages Unlikely in Bias Lawsuits, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., June 23,1999, at A10 (noting that the Court "left many important questions
unanswered" and did not "define a good-faith effort"); see also EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the punitive damages analysis is
the same for the Americans with Disabilities Act as it is for Title VII, and noting- that
Kolstad did not provide a "definitive standard for determining what constitutes good-faith
compliance with the antidiscrimination requirements of the ADA").
225. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2129; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d at 1248 (noting that
anti-discrimination policies and education requirements are the only expressed factors
going to good faith).
226. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2129.
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to eliminate discrimination, the deterrent purpose of punitive
damages may be undermined. Therefore, in order to effectuate the
enforcement role of punitive damages, courts should require a narrow
interpretation of "good-faith efforts" and should only permit juries to
consider those efforts when they are closely related to preventing the
particular type of discrimination at issue.
In proving good-faith efforts, employers should be required to
prove efforts they in good faith and reasonably expected would
prevent and correct discriminationP 7  Moreover, courts should
require that these efforts be narrowly tailored to prevent the specific
type and quality of discrimination that has actually occurred in a given
case.P For example, if, as in Kolstad, the intentional discrimination
is based on gender, the good-faith effort should be an effort to
prevent gender discrimination, not just discrimination generally. In
Kolstad's case on remand, the employer should be responsible for
demonstrating that its policies and practices were carefully designed
to ensure that directors would not base promotion decisions on
gender. Anything less specific should not shield the employer from
punitive damages. However, the potential for abuse in an employer-
227. The spirit of this suggestion is reflected in a concurring opinion of a California
Supreme Court justice in White v. Ultramar, Inc., 981 P.2d 944, 958 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J.,
concurring). In discussing whether a punitive damages award was proper under a state
statute barring retaliatory discharge, the justice considered the holding of Kostad. See id.(Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Mosk recognized, of course, that the court was not bound
by Kolstad's mandates, but argued that, even under Kolstad, an employer should not be
shielded from liability "by the expedient of a [sic] having a pro forma official policy-
issued by high-level management-while conferring broad discretion in lower-level
employees to implement company policy in a discriminatory ... manner." Id. (Mosk, J.,
concurring). The justice further asserted that, "[ilt is what the company does ... not just
what it says in a stated or written policy, that matters." Id. (Mosk, J., concurring); see also
Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1999)(rejecting the possibility that an employer's general antidiscrimination policies could
satisfy "good-faith efforts"). On remand after Kolstad, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Deffenbaugh determined that Wal-Mart did not establish a good-faith defense as a
matter of law simply by encouraging employees to contact higher management with their
grievances. See id; see also Punitive Damages-Employment Discrimination-"Good-
Faith Effort" Defense, 14 No. 12 FED. LITIGATOR 308, 309 (1999) (recommending, in light
of the Deffenbaugh opinion, that employers have "specific policies in place that focus
particularly on the requirements of Title VII or the ADA").
228. For example, in Cavuoti v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 735 A.2d 548, 556 (N.J.
1999), the Supreme Court of New Jersey analogized the Kostad "good-faith efforts"
standard to a state anti-harassment statute and concluded that, in the case at hand, "good
faith" required measures that were truly effective against harassment as a particular type
of discrimination. See id. at 555-56. Also, the efforts needed to be specifically targeted at
the individuals who engaged in the harassment. See id. at 556. The court stated that "the
efficacy [of] an employer's remedial program is highly relevant to both the employee's
claim against the employer and the employer's defense to liability." Id.
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sympathetic court is stronger because the Court did not more
carefully explain "good-faith efforts."
Attorneys and their corporate clients now know that a "good-
faith efforts" showing can prevent punitive damage liability. In future
cases, employers will be able to tailor their defenses very carefully
around the "good faith" language of Kolstad.29  Trial strategy
targeting a broad reading of good faith may convince juries of good-
faith efforts based on the quantity of measures taken to respond to
discrimination generally rather than the quality of measures taken to
prevent the specific type of discrimination in the case at bar.20 At the
very least, the vague safe harbor provision of Kolstad could shift
employers' focus toward compliance tools that do more to prevent
liability for discrimination than to prevent discrimination itself.P' In
this way, Kolstad has compromised one of Title Vil's strongest
deterrence mechanisms-punitive damages-and offered in exchange
an employer incentive policy whose benefits are questionable at
best. 2
As the Kolstad Court explained, punitive damages are reserved
only for cases where the wrongdoer intentionally discriminated on a
protected basis and did so knowing the discrimination was unlawful.m33
Willful misconduct of this type merits special action, and the punitive
damage provision can serve to enforce the protections offered by
Title VII against abuse by those who would disregard those
protections maliciously. Despite the limited applicability of these
damages and the fact that Congress has placed strict caps on them,
the Court has limited punitive damages still further. The Court has
narrowed the field of employees whose behavior can be imputed to
the employer and has created a very broad defense based on the
employer's own actions. These limitations were not solicited by the
229. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in
Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 959, 1001-07 (1999)
(explaining the evidentiary advantage possessed by employers and the ways in which
defense attorneys encourage constant and meticulous documentation that would serve to
exonerate employers in the event of litigation).
230. See id. at 1027-28 (discussing the advantage employers have in production of
witnesses to testify and ample documentation of preventative measures).
231. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 221, at 34-35 (noting that the employment law
experts upon whom employers frequently rely typically gear their advice toward symbolic
displays of compliance rather than substantive reductions in discrimination).
232. See generally Leading Cases, supra note 205, at 364-66 (arguing that, by limiting
vicarious liability for punitive damages, Kolstad has undermined Congressional intent and
left employers with no more incentive to prevent discrimination than they had before
punitive damages were permitted).
233. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2125-26; supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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text of Title VII, nor were they necessary to promote Title VII's
preventive purpose. The Court nevertheless created them, and
lower courts must now construe these limitations in -ways that allow
the punitive damages provision to continue to serve its important
deterrence function.235
ANN M. ANDERSON
234. See supra notes 134-43,207-23 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 144-97,224-32 and accompanying text.
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